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Force: present and past 
 
What is force?  
When asked in such general terms, this question seems almost devoid of sense. Today, one 
often hears people talking about many different kinds of force having little or nothing in 
common with each other: the force of personality, electrical and gravitational forces, military 
force, the force of muscles and the spiritual force necessary to face life's difficulties. The 
notion of “force” does not constitute a subject worth of interdisciplinary discussions between 
philosophers, scientists, theologian and technologists. 
 
However, it has not always been this way: in the eighteenth century and in the first half of the 
nineteenth century it was possible to debate the nature, measure and conservation of force in a 
general sense. There was one force (Latin "vis", French "force", German "Kraft", Italian 
“forza”). That notion of force was a philosophical one, in that it was expected to have 
universal validity, but it was at the same time possible to search for its material 
manifestations, and for its measure.  
 
When studying those discussions, it is usually difficult  - if not impossible - to distinguish 
between philosophical disputes on the existence of a cosmic, unifying principle behind the 
perceived variety of the world, and discussion about what we today would regard as 
experiments or as mathematical models. This often happens in studying pre-modern natural 
philosophy, but the case of force is particularly interesting, because this notion was for a long 
time a point of exchange, a “trading zone”, in which philosophy, mathematics and experiment 
met.1 In this very brief, episodic sketch of early modern notions of force, I will try to show 
how they could be defined by philosophical-theological statements, experiments, 
mathematical concepts and, finally, by measurement procedures. We shall also see how the 
ideas of “measure” and “conservation of force” changed in the course of time. 
 
 
Leibniz's force: metaphysical conservation and its measure 
 
Around the end of the seventeenth century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was 
engaged in a discussion with philosophers of the Cartesian school of thought: it was a debate 
on how to find the true measure of the force of a moving body. What did they mean be true 
measure? What was the force of a moving body for them?  
Leibniz and his opponents shared two premises: first, the force of a moving body was its 
capacity of becoming itself cause of motion; second, force could neither be created nor 
destroyed, but could only pass on from one body to another. 
 
For the Cartesians, the force of a body was proportional to its mass (M) and its velocity (V): 
the measure of force was therefore the product of the two: MV, an expression which both they 
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and Leibniz referred to as "quantity of motion", as is still done today in physics. As the 
Cartesians knew, in many mechanical processes quantity of motion is conserved and was 
therefore the true measure of force. Leibniz, however, disagreed with them: for him, the 
quantity of motion of a body was only a relative property, apt to change according to the 
observation point and therefore unreal. As such, even if it happened to be conserved, it could 
never be identical to the real force of a body. This difference had a deep metaphysical 
significance:  
 
Cette consideration de la force distinguée de la quantité de mouvement est assez 
importante non seulement en physique, [...] mais encor dans la metaphysique; [...] 
car le mouvement, si on n'y considere que ce qu'il comprend precisement et 
formellement, c'est à dire un changement de place, n'est pas une chose entierement 
reelle [...] Mais la force ou cause prochâine de ces changements est quelque chose 
de plus reelle, et il y a assez de fondement pour l'attribuer à un corps plus qu'à 
l'autre.2 
 
Using results obtained by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Leibniz claimed that the true measure 
of force was the quantity MV², which is conserved when bodies fall, and which he called "live 
force" ("vis viva"). Since "live force" is proportional to today's kinetic energy (½MV²), 
historians and scientists have looked at Leibniz as the discoverer of energy conservation. 
However, for him the conservation of "live force", which could actually be observed and 
measured, did not constitute an argument in favour of the conservation of the real force – 
otherwise, also the conservation of quantity of motion would have been relevant. The 
conservation of force could only be demonstrated on the basis of metaphysical considerations, 
and experiments could only establish in which perceivable and measurable form force 
manifested itself.  
 
 
Newton's force: mathematics, physics and divine will 
 
In his works, Isaac Newton (1642-1727) used the term "force" (lat. "vis") in many different 
ways, whose interpretations remains the subject of debates. In his "Philosophiae naturalis 
principia matemathica" (1687),  where he introduce the notion of gravitational force, Newton 
underscored how this gravitational force was nothing but a "mathematical notion" and should 
in no way be confused with "true and physical" forces:  
 
Hasce virium quantitates, brevitatis gratia, nominare licet vires motrices, 
acceleratrices, et absolutas [...] Mathematicus duntaxat est hic conceptus: nam 
virium causas et sedes physicas jam non expendo. [...] Unde caveat lector, ne per 
hujusmodi voces cogitet me speciem vel modum actionis causamve, aut rationem 
physicam, alicubi definire.3 
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It is not at all clear what "real and physical forces" would be according to Newton and, in the 
course of his life, he expresses very different opinions on the subject. In his Optics, for 
example, he wrote:  
 
It seems to me farther, that these particles [= particles of matter] have not only a 
Vis inertiae, accompanied with such Passive laws of motion as naturally result 
from that force; but also that they are moved by certain Active principles, such as 
is that of gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of bodies. 
These principles I consider not as Occult qualities, supposed to result from the 
specifick forms of things, but as general laws of Nature, by which the things 
themselves are formed: their truth appearing to us by phaenomena, though their 
causes be not yet discovered. For these are manifest qualities, and their causes 
only are occult.4  
 
Whatever Newton's ideas on the real forces of nature, or “active principles”, may have been, 
one thing is sure: he did not believe in the conservation of force, and was instead convinced 
that, without a constant intervention of active principle of an immaterial nature, all motion in 
the universe would eventually come to an end. These active principles were a direct 
expression of the divine will: only the constant intervention of god could guarantee the 
stability of the solar system.  
 
This opinion was fiercely opposed by Leibniz, who maintained that force subsists eternally 
unchanged, and claimed that Newton was assuming god to be in a condition in which he had 
no choice but continually make miracles. For Leibniz, this was tantamount to doubting god's 
omnipotence: 
 
Selon mon sentiment, la même force et vigeur y [i.e. in the world] subsiste 
tousjours, et passe seulement de matiere en matiere, suivant les loix de la nature, e 
le bel ordre preétabili. Et je tiens, quand Dieu fait des miracles, que ce n'est pas 
pour soutenir les besoins de la nature, mais pour ceux de la grace. En juger 




Early seventeenth century: metaphysics, astrology, mathematics and horses 
 
In the first decades of the eighteenth century, mathematical, metaphysical and theological 
reflections on force and its measure were combined with the results of procedures aimed at 
empirically determining various quantities, all of them called "force". The English naturalist 
Stephen Hales (1677-1761) experimentally compared the force of the sap rising within plants 
with the force of blood circulation in animals: 
 
The force of the rising sap in the morning is plainly owing to the energy of the 
root and stem. [...] Which force is near five times greater than the force of the 
blood in the great crural artery of a Horse; seven times greater than the force of 
the blood in the like artery of a Dog; and eight times greater than the blood's force 
in the same artery of a fallow Doe.6 
                                                 
4
  I. Newton, Optics, in: Opera omnia Vol. 4, ed. S. Horsley (1779-1785)  p. 260-261. 
5
 G. W. Leibniz and S. Clarke, Streitschriften zwischen Leibniz und Clarke 1715, 1716, in: G. W. Leibniz., 
Philosophischen Schrifte Vol. 7, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (1890) p. 352. 
6
 S. Hales, Vegetable Staticks (1726-27), ed. M. A. Hoskin (1961) p. 60-61. 
 In the Encyclopédie (35. vols., 1751-1780) of Denis Diderot (1713-1784), various methods 
were discussed through which the force of animals could be quantified and compare with that 
of workers of different nationalities:   
 
Un cheval est égal en force, pour tirer, à cinq travailleurs anglois, suivant les 
observations de Jonas Moore; à six ou sept françois, suivant nos auteurs; ou à 7 
hollandois, selon Desaguliers: mais pour porter une charge sur le dos, deux 
hommes sont aussi forts, et quelquefois plus qu'un cheval.7 
 
At the same time, European philosopher were discussing whether to accept the newtonian 
idea of a force of attraction acting at a distance between the planets. Some claimed that this 
notion of force was a relapse into the obscure and barbaric concept of astral influence. On this 
subject, Georg Matthias Bose (1710-1761) composed a satiric rhyme directed against 
newtonian gravitation:: 
 
Actio per distans dabitur? tunc impediesne 
Quo minus in distans stella Talisman agat? 
Gaude Melanchton, redeunt horoscopus, Haly, 
Almutec, Athacir, Alcecadenor, Hylec.8 
 
In this context, the discussions on the nature of force, on its measure and on its conservation 
became increasingly complex, and, in the years 1739-40, David Hume (1711-1776) wrote: 
 
I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, 
necessity, connexion and productive quality, are all nearly synonimous; and 
therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest.9 
 
In the same years, Voltaire summarized the problem of the conservation of force in these 
words:  
 
Un homme a une certaine quantité de force active, mais où était cette force avant 
sa naissance? Si on dit qu'elle était dans le germe de l'enfant, qu'est-ce qu'une 
force qu'on ne peut exercer? Mais quand il est devenu homme, n'est-il pas libre? 
Ne peut-il pas employer plus ou moins de sa force? Je suppose qu'il exerce une 
force de trois cents livres pour mouvoir une machine; je suppose comme il est 
possible qu'il a exercé cette force en baissant un levier, et que la machine attachée 
à ce levier est dans le récipient du vide; la machine peut acquerir aisément une 
force de deux mille livres.  L'operation étant fait, le bras retiré, le levier ôté, le 
poids immobile, je demande si le peu de matière qui était dans le récipient, a reçu 
de la machine une force de deux mille livre, toutes ce considérations ne font-elles 
pas voire que la force active se répare et se perd continuellement dans la nature?10 
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Sceptical Enlightenment: can we know the real force? 
  
In the following yeas, discussions in Europe about the conservation and the true measure of 
force became increasingly rare. At the same time, though, natural philosophers became 
attracted to the notion that, beside gravity,  other phenomena, too, might be better understood 
with the help of mathematical forces.   
This point of view assumed a very specific form in the case of Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon 
(1707-1788), who claimed that a link of essential nature existed between a force and its 
mathematical expression. An elementary force of nature could only have a simple 
mathematical form, which was its measure:  
 
De quelque façon que nous puissions donc supposer qu'une qualité physique 
puisse varier, comme cette qualité est une, sa variation sera simple et toujours 
exprimable par un seul terme, qui en sera la mesure; et dès qu'on voudra employer 
deux termes, on détruira l'unité de la qualité physique, parce que ces deux termes 
représenteront deux variations différentes dans la même qualité, c'est-à-dire deux 
qualités au lieu d'une. Deux termes sont en effet deux mesures, toutes deux 
variables et inégalement variables; et dès-lors elles ne peuvent être appliquées à 
un sujet simple, à une seule qualité; et si on admet deux termes pour représenter 
l'effet de la force centrale d'un astre, il est nécessaire d'avouer qu'au lieu d'une 
force il y en a deux, dont l'une sera relative au premiere terme, et l'autre relative 
au seconde terme.11 
 
However, force could not be known beyond its mathematical expression and its perceivable 
effect: 
 
L'on ne connait les forces qui animent l'univers, que par le mouvement et par ses 
effets: ce mot même de forces ne signifie rien de matériel, e n'indique rien de ce 
qui peut affecter nos organes, qui cependent sont nos seuls moyen de 
communication avec la nature.12 
 
Buffon's statement reflected a certain tendency to scepticism which had become quite diffuse 
in Europe around the middle of the eighteenth century, and which had led many philosophers 
to doubt that it would ever be possible to know the true forces of nature. A few years later, the 
German physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) published a work on the 
"building impulse" of organic bodies. This impulse was the force determining reproduction 
and growth. In the passage in which he described the "building impulse" as a force, however, 
Blumenbach  thought it important caution his readers: 
 
Hoffentlich ist für die mehrsten Leser die Erinnerung sehr überflüßig, daß das 
Wort Bildungstrieb so gut, wie die Worte Attraction, Schwere etc. zu nichts mehr 
und nichts weniger dienen soll, als eine Kraft zu bezeichnen, deren Constante 
Wirkung aus der Erfahrung anerkannt worden, deren Ursache aber so gut wie die 
Ursache der genannten, noch so allgemein anerkannten Naturkräfte, für uns 
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qualitas occulta ist. Es gilt von allen diesen Kräften was Ovid sagt: causa latet, vis 
est notissima.13 
 
The mathematical force: attraction and repulsion 
 
Around the end of the century, however, the faith in mathematical analysis of motion as a new 
path to the knowledge of the forces of nature increased. Whereas, a few years earlier, 
philosophers doubted that Newton’s mathematical expression of the gravitational force could 
correspond to any phyisical reality, now all forces of nature came to be thought of as central 
forces of attractive or repulsive character, with a mathematical expression similar to that of 
Newton’s gravitation. These were not only “mathematical forces”, as Newton had cautioned, 
but also the real, physical ones. A factor which certainly contributed to spread this view was 
the discovery and investigation of phenomena of electrical attraction and repulsion. 
 
The British theologian and experimental natural philosopher Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) 
defined matter as characterized by attractive and repulsive powers:  
 
I define it [d. h.: die Materie] to be a substance possessed of the property of extension, 
and of powers of attraction and repulsion. [...] Matter is not impenetrable [...] but [...] 
consists of physical points only, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion, taking 
place at different distances, that is, surrounded with various spheres of attraction and 
repulsion; [...] Provided, therefore, that any body move with a sufficient degree of 
velocity, or have sufficient momentum to overcome any powers of repulsion that it may 
meet with, it will find no difficulty in making its way through any body whatever.14 
 
Attractive and repulsive forces were at the basis of all material phenomena also according to 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who, in his "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der 




Anziehungskraft ist diejenige bewegende Kraft, wodurch eine Materie die Ursache der 
Annäherung anderer zu ihr sein kann (oder, welches einerlei ist, dadurch sie der 
Entfernung anderer von ihr widersteht).  
Zurückstoßungskraft ist diejenige, wodurch eine Materie Ursache sein kann, andere von 
sich zu entfernen (oder, welches einerlei ist, wodurch sie der Annäherung anderer zu ihr 
widersteht). Die letztere werden wir auch zuweilen treibende, so wie die erstere 




Es lassen sich nur diese zwei bewegenden Kräfte der Materie denken. Denn alle 
Bewegung, die eine Materie  einer anderen eindrücken kann, da in dieser Rücksicht jede 
derselben nur wie ein Punkt betrachtet wird, muß jederzeit als in der geraden Linie 
zwischen zweien Punkten erteilt angesehen werden. In dieser geraden Linie aber sind 
nur zweierlei Bewegungen möglich: die eine, dadurch sich jene Punkte von einander 
entfernen, die zweite, dadurch sie sich einander nähern. Die Kraft aber, die die Ursache 
der ersteren Bewegung ist, heißt Zurückstoßungs- und die der zweiten Anziehungskraft. 
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Also können nur diese zwei Arten von Kräften, als solche, worauf alle Bewegungskräfte 
in der materiellen Natur zurückgeführt werden müssen, gedacht werden.15 
 
For Kant, the mathematical form of Newton’s gravitational theory was the model for all 
forces which could be rationally conceived. We would certainly disagree with this view, but 
we must note the powerful effect that the mathematical notion of attractive and repulsive 
force had had on the philosopher.   
 
Pierre Simon Laplace (1749-1827), who was the undisputed leader of natural philosophy in  
Napoleonic France, based all research in his school on the assumption that all phenomena in 
nature could be explained and described in terms of attractive and repulsive forces having a 
mathematical form analogous to that of newtonian gravitation.16 In his "Exposition du 
système du monde" (1796), Laplace wrote: 
 
L'attraction disparaît entre le corps d'une grandeur peu considérable: elle reparaît dans 
leurs élémens sous une infinité de formes. La solidité, la cristallisation, la réfraction de 
la lumière, l'élévation e l'abaissement des liquides dans les espaces capillaires, et 
généralement toutes les combinaisons chimiques sont le résultat de forces dont la 
connaissance est un des principaux objects de l'étude de la nature. Ainsi la matière est 
soumise à l'empire de diverses forces attractives: l'une d'elles s'étendant indéfiniment 
dans l'espace, régit les mouvemens de la terre et des corps célestes: tout ce qui tient à la 
constitution intime de substances qui les composent, dépend principalement des autres 
forces dont l'action n'est sensible qu'à des distances imperceptibles.17 
 
However, the Lapalcian dream of explaining nature only in terms of central forces failed and, 
by the first decades of the nineteenth century, natural philosopher had abandoned the 
Laplacian approach, and felt free to use any mathematical models they might find appropriate, 
usually without attaching to them any particular epistemological significance. 
 
 
Force and measure, again: the conservation of energy 
 
Even though the idea of force had come to be closely associated with a very specific  
mathematical notion, there were still many authors who were not ready to accept the 
quantification and mathematisation of such a fundamental philosophical concept. One of them 
was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), whose works would be a source for the 
current of thought now known as “Naturphilosophie”. The theme of the cosmic unity of forces 
was at the centre Schelling’s early work, and later of "Naturphilosophie”. 
 
The young Schelling criticized the tendency of his time to undervalue or even forget the 
philosophical problems linked to the study of nature, and in particular to the definition of 
fundamental concepts such as "force":  
 
So wird mit dem Begriff von Kraft jetzt häufiger als je in der Physik gespielt, 
besonders seitdem man an der Materialität des Lichts u. s. w. zu zweifeln anfieng; 
hat man doch schon einigemale gefragt: Ob nicht die Elektricität vielleicht die 
Lebenskraft seyn möchte? Alle diese vage, in die Physik widerrechtlich 
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eingeführten Begriffe, mußte ich, da sie nur philosphisch zu berichtigen sind, im 
ersten Theil dieser Schrift in ihrer Unbestimmtheit lassen.18 
 
Main feature of young Schelling's philosophy of nature was the principle of dynamical 
equilibrium between equal and opposite forces. Forces in dynamical equilibrium constantly 
interacted with each other, originating not only all material transformations, but also the 
conscience which humans have of such transformations:  
 
Nur einer freyen Thätigkeit in mir gegenüber nimmt, was frey auf mich wirkt, die 
Eigenschaften der Wirklichkeit an; nur an der ursprünglichen Kraft meines Ich 
bricht sich die Kraft einer Außenwelt. Aber umgekehrt auch, (so wie der 
Lichtstrahl nur an Körpern zur Farbe wird) wird die ursprüngliche Thätigkeit in 
mir erst am Objekte zum Denken, zum selbstbewußten Vorstellen. [...] Die 
Grundkräfte der Materie sind also nichts weiter, als der Ausdruck jener 
ursprünglichen Thätigkeiten für den Verstand, und so wird es uns leicht werden, 
sie vollends ganz zu bestimmen.19 
 
The historian and philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) published in 1969 an 
much discussed article on "Energy conservation as an example of simultaneous discovery"20. 
The subject of energy conservation is very relevant for us, because the term “energy” only 
became common after its conservation was discovered: the historical actors involved in the 
investigation instead spoke of the conservation of force. 
 
Kuhn claimed that the discovery of energy conservation, which was made at the same time by 
a number of researchers during the first half of the nineteenth century, was the result of the 
combination of three factors: first, the discovery of processes of interconversion of 
mechanical work, electromotive power and heat; second, the interest in steam engines an in 
electric ones, which was due to the Industrial Revolution; third, the diffusion of ideas linked 
to "Naturphilosophie”. Once again, the notion of force was the meeting point – or the “trading 
zone” - between philosophy, science and technology. 
 
In this context, a new measure of conserved force was born, obtained by  transforming heat, 
electricity and chemical potential into mechanical work, and then measuring the latter by 
using it to raise a certain weight to a certain height. This time, however, the conserved force 
was not anymore defined on the grounds of the metaphysical principles of a specific 
philosophical system, as had been the case with Leibniz and the Cartesians: now, the 
measured force was defined by, and thus in practice identified with, its measurable effect:  
 
Eine Ursache, welche die Hebung einer Last bewirkt, ist eine Kraft; ihre Wirkung, 
die gehobene Last, ist also ebenfalls eine Kraft; allgemeiner ausgedrückt heisst 
dies: räumliche Differenz ponderabler Objekte ist eine Kraft.21 
 
These words are taken from the article by Julius Robert Mayer (1814-1878) titled 
"Bemerkungen über die Kräfte der unbelebten Natur", which is considered one of the earliest 
essays to expound the idea of the conservation of energy. In this text, the notion of force 
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constitutes the point in which theoretical philosophy, experimental research and technical 
knowledge touch, superpose and mix with each other in a productive symbiosis. The same can 
be said for the works of other authors who are candidate to the title of "discoverer" of the law 
of energy conservation, as for example Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), Michael 
Faraday (1791-1867) e James Prescott Joule (1818-1889). The latter wrote on the 
conservation of "live force":  
 
Thus, when a weight falls to the ground, it has been generally supposed that its 
living force is absolutely annihilated, and that  the labour which may have been 
expended in raising it to the elevation from which it fell has been entirely thrown 
away and wasted, without the production of any permanent effect whatever. We 
may reason, a priori, that such absolute destruction of living force cannot possibly 
take place, because it is manifestly absurd to suppose that the powers with which 
God has endowed matter can be destroyed any more than that they can be created 
by man's agency; but we are not left with this argument alone, decisive as it must 
be to every unprejudiced mind. The common experience of every one teaches him 
that living force is not destroyed by the friction or collision of bodies. We have 
reason to believe that the manifestations of living force on our globe are, at 
present time, as extensive as those which have existed at any time since its 
creation, or, at  any rate, since the deluge.22 
 
The thoughts of Joule and Leibniz may appear similar, but they are very different: while 
Leibniz assumed the conservation of force and sought its measure in an empirically conserved 
quantity, Joule used the existence of such an empirically conserved measure as an argument in 
favour of the conservation of force.   
However, for Joule as for Leibniz, the conservation of force was more than a simple regularity 
which could be empirically observed: it was a reality which could be reconnected to 
theological-metaphysical principles. According to Joule, the conservation of force derived 
from divine providence and omnipotence, but this argument, "decisive" as it was "to every 
unprejudiced mind" could and should be corroborated by experimental evidence. The 
conserved force thus tended to become indistinguishable from the measurable force. 
 
 
Epilogue: what remains of a glorious past? 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the new scientific notion of a conserved and 
measurable force became associated with the term "energy". Thus, energy became the new 
force, which was and still is discussed between scientists, philosopher and technologists - but 
this is another story.  
 
The term "force" continued being used in scientific fields almost only within the context of 
mathematical models (mechanical force, force of gravity, electromagnetic force field). At the 
same time, authors like Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) used the term "force" to indicate 
non-measurable (an therefore non-scientific) notions, such as will:  
 
Bisher subsumierte man den Begriff  Wille unter den Begriff Kraft; dagegen 
mache ich es gerade umgekehrt und will jede Kraft in der Natur als Wille gedacht 
wissen, [...]  so haben wir in der That ein Unbekannteres auf ein unendlich 
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1884) p. 265-276. 
Bekannteres, ja, auf das einzige uns wirklich unmittelbar und ganz und gar 
Bekannte zürückgeführt und unsere Erkenntniß um ein sehr großes erweitert.23 
 
However, “force” never again regained its role  as a point of exchange between philosophy, 




[A shorter version of this article was published in Italian in: Energia, ambiente e innovazione 
49 (2003) p. 71-78 ] 
 
                                                 
23
 A. Schopenhauer, Die welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. I (3a ed. Lipsia 1859) p. 165-166. 
